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WAIVER OF COUNSEL IN STATE NON-CAPITAL
CRIMINAL TRIALS
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957)
This case illustrates the thoroughness with which a trial judge must
approach the problem of insuring to every criminal defendant his
constitutional right to counsel, and the burden which the court must
meet in order to insure that the defendant's waiver of counsel will not,
years later, 'be grounds for a new trial.
Petitioner, a seventeen year old Negro with only a seventh grade
education, was arrested for the murder of an elderly lady. While in
custody, and before arraignment, the sheriff had led Moore to believe
he was in danger of mob violence and had encouraged him to confess if,
in fact, he was guilty. This was corroborated by the sheriff's testimony
before the Michigan court which heard the motion for a new trial.
At the arraignment the trial judge asked petitioner whether he
had a lawyer or desired to have one. Petitioner replied that he neither
had, nor desired to have a lawyer, but that he merely wanted to get
the matter over with as speedily as possible. Before accepting a plea
of guilty the judge conferred with the petitioner who talked freely of
the crime but complained that there was "something wrong with my
head." Observing that petitioner had previously been in trouble with
the law for breaking and entering, and unlawfully taking automobiles,
the judge found petitioner guilty of murder in the first degree and
sentenced him to life imprisonment-the maximum penalty for murder
in Michigan.
Eleven years later petitioner commenced this action in the state
courts as a delayed motion for a new trial upon the ground that his
conviction was invalid because he had lacked the assistance of counsel
at the time of his plea and sentence. The state courts denied relief.'
The Supreme Court of the United States, splitting five to four, reversed.
The determining question was whether there had been an effective
waiver of the right to counsel. The majority stressed the fact that
counsel could have taken advantage of defenses that were suggested
by the facts (i.e., insanity, the fact that the evidence against Moore was
purely circumstantial), and that the waiver appeared not to be freely
given. The dissent stressed the time lapse (nineteen years by the time
the case reached the Supreme Court), and that the results of the
conference with the trial judge indicated that the waiver was freely made.
It is well established that a defendant in a capital or non-capital
criminal trial is denied due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
1People v. Moore, 344 Mich. 137, 73 N.E.2d 274 (1955).
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mentF when he is denied counsel and is thereby prevented from making
a fair defense.' The case of Betts v. Bradyj, however, held that a
person accused of robbery was not, as a matter of right, entitled to
court appointed counsel although he requested such appointment and
could not afford to hire counsel. In spite of the fact that the trend
is now toward finding that special circumstances exist which require
the appointment of counsel, this determination must be made in the
light of the facts of each case. 5
It is to be noted that the right to counsel in the state courts is not
coextensive with the right to counsel in the federal courts. The sixth
amendment6 was held in Betts v. Brady7 to be inapplicable to the states.
This position was reaffirmed -by the case of Gallegos v. Nebraska.' Denial
of couhsel is not a violation of the United States Constitution unless
,the absence of counsel results in a denial to the accused of the essentials
of justice.
Although the circumstances are such that the accused would be
guaranteed counsel by the Constitution, this right can be waived.9 The
waiver, however, can only -be made by an accused who has an under-
standing of his rights. In Uveges v. Pennsylvania," a seventeen-year-old
defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and was sentenced to serve twenty
to eighty years in prison. At the time he entered his plea he was neither
offered counsel nor informed of his right to counsel. It was held that
he was entitled to the assistance of counsel and that he had not waived
this right. The waiver of right to counsel will not be presumed.'
As indicated above, a plea of guilty does not necessarily indicate
a waiver of right to counsel, 2 but it may ,be an important factor in the
court's consideration. The Supreme Court of Michigan-in People v.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. No state may ". . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. ."
3 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134
(1951) ; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
4316 U.S. 455 (1941). The cases cited supra note 3 indicate that this case
has been sharply distinguished.
5 See, e.g., Bute v. Illinois, supra note 3, where the court recognized the
special circumstances rule but held that it was not applicable to the facts of
the case.
6 U.S. CONST. amend VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right .. . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
7 Supra note 4.
8342 U.S. 55 (1951).
9 Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946). In this case the waiver was
express. The judge, however, did appoint counsel to assist the accused during
sentencing.
10 Supra note 3.
1 1 Annot., 149 A.L.R. 1403 (1944).
12 Ibid.
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Crandell, "s held that a fifteen-year-old defendant who had been sen-
tenced to life for murder did not, after pleading guilty without advice
of counsel, have a right to have counsel appointed. In re Burson 4
held that a plea of guilty raises a presumption of waiver of right to
counsel. The United States Supreme Court has held15 that an adult
defendant who pleaded guilty to murder and who was not offered
counsel nor informed of his right to counsel was not denied a consti-
tutional right. The Court went on to say that there could be no violation
of such right unless the deprivation of counsel operated unfairly to
deprive defendant of his freedom. In Foster v. Illinois,"8 the defendant
pleaded guilty without being informed of his right to counsel, but the
trial judge did inform him of the consequences of his plea. It was
held that there was no denial of a constitutional right. Where the
error of the court in denying assistance of counsel in making the plea
could have been brought to the court's attention by counsel who repre-
sented the defendant at a later stage in the trial and was not, it has
been held that the question could not -be thereafter raised by habeas
corpus."7 However, in House v. Mayo, the Court held that the refusal
of the trial judge to permit the accused to confer with his counsel prior
to entering his plea was a denial of due process.
In addition to presence or absence of a guilty plea, there are several
other factors relevant to the determination of whether there has been
a waiver of the right to counsel. It is, generally, a combination of
factors that is decisive in the particular case.
It is more likely that no waiver will be found if the accused was
under an incapacity, e.g., insanity' 9 or minority.2" It will be noted that
Moore was a minor and that it was suggested that he may have had a
mental defect. Circumstances bearing upon the likelihood of the accused
13270 Mich. 124, 258 N.AV. 224 (1935).
14 152 Ohio St. 375, 89 N.E.2d 651 (1949).
15 Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950). In contrast to the principal
case the accused in Quicksall, supra, was not informed of his rights to counsel.
In the principal case, however, unlike the Quicksall case, supra, the accused was a
young, uneducated boy, who was prejudiced by lack of counsel.
16 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
17 Canizio v. N.Y., 327 U.S. 82 (1946).
18 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
19 Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954), where the Court said, "We
cannot hold an insane man tried without counsel to the requirement of tendering
the issue of his insanity at the trial." The problem is the same when the accused
is uneducated. This accounts, in part, for the fact that a lapse of time is not
likely to be a bar to review even though witnesses have died in the interim.
A possible defense of insanity was also, to some extent, responsible for a reversal
in Palmer v. Ashe, supra note 3.
20 It is especially to be noted that in the case of De Meerleer v. Michigan,
329 U.S. 663 (1947), relied upon by the majority, the defendant was a youth
of seventeen, while the defendant in the case of Quicksall v. Michigan, supra
note 15, was an adult in his forties.
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being aware of his rights, e.g., prior criminal record2 ' or education, 22
will be considered -by the courts. In the principal case Moore had
received very little education, indicating the probability of a lack of
intelligent waiver. This is, however, partially offset by the fact that he
had previously -been in trouble with the law indicating that the waiver
may have been intelligent in spite of the other factors.
The fact that the accused was not informed of his right to counsel
is generally very important, 23 'but, of course, petitioner was informed
of this right. At times, the mere failure of the accused to request
counsel will be held to amount to a waiver of counsel.24 If an accused
who goes to trial without counsel has 'been the victim of mistake on
the part of the court or unfair tactics on the part of public officials
and these tactics could have been prevented 'by the appointment of
counsel, such factors are likely to lead to a new trial.25 The only tactic
of this nature in the present case was the suggestion of coercion by
the sheriff.
An inept defense on the part of a defendant who is without
counsel will often lead the reviewing 'court to hold that there has been
an unconstitutional denial of counsel. 6 Petitioner in the instant case
21 Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (fourth offender); In re Burson,
supra note 14 (second offender). Contra, Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 122
(1956). The court said: "We cannot agree with the Pennsylvania Superior Court
that, the mere fact that petitioner had, without the benefit of counsel, pleaded
guilty to an offense two years before showed that he had the capacity to defend
himself against the thirty charges here."
22 See Herman v. Claudy, supra note 21, where the petitioner had only six
years of schooling; accord, Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
23 Herman v. Claudy, supra note 2.1; Bute v. Illinois, supra note 3; De
Meerleer v. Michigan, supra note 20; Rice v. Olson, 324- U.S. 786 (1945). But see
Quicksall v. Michigan, supra note 15, where a conviction was sustained in spite
of this.
24 In Quicksall v. Michigan, supra note 15, this factor was relevant in
denying petitioner's petition, but in Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949), and
Rice v. Olson, supra note 23, this factor did not prevent a decision in favor of
the petitioner.
25 Townsend v. Burke, supra note 3. The accused who was without counsel,
was denied due process when the court based its sentence upon misinformation.
In Smith v. O'Grady, supra note 22, conviction was rendered void because the
petitioner was told that he was pleading guilty to one offense, when in fict
he was pleading guilty to a more serious offense. In Brook v. Ohio, 17 Ohio App.
510 (1923), the court reached a similar result because the judge had thought
that the accused was waiving counsel, but, in reality, he only intended to indicate
that he could not afford to hire his own counsel.
26 Gibbs v. Burke, supra note 24, where the defendant's failure to object
to hearsay, among other things, indicated that he was incapable of adequately
representing himself; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948), where request of
accused for counsel had been refused, and he conducted his own defense. It was
held that the accused was one of those persons incapable of representing thm-
selves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature. In Stephenson
v. State, 4 Ohio App. 128 (1915), appointed counsel refused to act and the
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made no defense at all, although a defense appears to have been possible,
at least in mitigating the degree of the crime.
A state statute requiring the appointment of counsel will not prevent
the Supreme Court from reviewing the question of denial of counsel
under the fourteenth amendment even though the state courts held that
the state statute was not violated.2 7 Compounding the difficulty in
obtaining a conviction that will be final is the doctrine that counsel
cannot be forced upon a defendant.2 s
Lapse of time is not a bar to a remedy where the denial of
counsel rendered a petitioner's conviction incompatible with due process.
29
When this time lapse is long-more than eleven years in the principal
case-it becomes difficult to prove that the accused was not prejudiced
by lack of counsel. This difficulty is compensated in part by putting
the burden of proving that the conviction violated due process upon the
person attacking that conviction.3 0
What are the courts and the prosecuting officials to do to insure
that a conviction cannot be successfully attacked collaterally where the
defendant has waived this right to counsel? It must be clearly shown
that the defendant was competent at the time of the trial, that he
was informed of his constitutional rights, that he was aware of the
consequences of -his action and of the implications of the pending action.
Furthermore, during the course of the trial, the court and the prosecuting
officials must not take unfair advantage of the fact that the defendant
lacks counsel. Most important, it must appear that the steps just men-
tioned appear in the record.
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defendant conducted his own defense, but so inadequately that it was held that
this amounted to no defense at all.
27 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
28 See Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), case
involving the sixth amendment; accord, Bute v. Illinois, supra note 3; Carter v.
Illinois, supra note 9.
2 9 palmer v. Ashe, supra note 3. See also Annot., 96 L. Ed 161 (1951).
30 Bute v. Illinois, supra note 3, in which the Court said, "doubts should be
resolved in favor of the integrity, competence and proper performance of their
official duties by the judge and the state attorney." And also, Foster v. Illinois,
supra note 16, where it was held: "In every case in which . . . due process
. . . was found wanting, the prisoner sustained the burden or was
prepared to prove but was denied the opportunity of proving, that for want of
benefit of counsel an ingredient of unfairness actively operated in the process
that resulted in confinement." But see Williams v. Kaiser, supra note 27, where
the Court said if defendant requested counsel, it would be presumed that he
lacked funds to employ counsel; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),
a case construing the right to counsel under the sixth amendment where the
Court said: "Courts indulge every reasonable oresumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights. .. ."
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